In 1818, the Supreme Court stated that:
"The exclusive
jurisdiction which the United States have in forts and dock-yards
ceded to them, is derived from the express assent of the states
by whom the cessions are made. It could be derived in no other manner;
because without it, the authority of the state would be supreme
and exclusive therein," 3 Wheat., at 350, 351.
[U.S. v.
Bevans,
16 U.S. 336 (1818), reaff. 19 U.S.C.A., section 1401(h).]
The above case establishes that the federal government only has
jurisdiction over federal property that it owns within the states
or coming under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution.In
other places, it has no legislative or judicial jurisdiction.Places
coming under the sovereignty or exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the federal government under 1:8:17 of the Constitution include
the District of Columbia, federal territories, and enclaves within
the state and we call these areas “the federal zone” throughout
this book. When Congress is operating in its exclusive jurisdiction
over the “federal zone”, it is important to remember that the U.S.
Government has full authority to enact legislation as private acts
pertaining to its boundaries, and it is not a state of the union
of States because it exists solely by virtue of the compact/constitution
that created it. The U.S. Constitution does not say that the District
of Columbia must guarantee a Republican form of Government to its
own subject citizens within its territories. (See Hepburn
& Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 US. 445(1805); Glaeser v. Acacia
Mut. Life Ass'n., 55 F. Supp., 925 (1944); Long v.
District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431
(1966), among others).
Within the federal zone, there are areas where the Bill of Rights
(the first ten amendments) applies and areas where it does not.
The best place to go for a clarification of where it applies is
the case of Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). Below are quotes
from that case establishing that we have two national governments:
"The idea prevails
with some -- indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar
-- that we have in this country substantially or practically two
national governments; one, to be maintained under the Constitution,
with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress
outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such
powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise."
Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901), supra.
The U.S. Constitution limits federal government jurisdiction
over the state Citizens using the Bill of Rights.
The federal government
has unlimited powers over federal citizens within territories of
the United States because it is acting outside of the Constitution.Administrative
laws are private acts, also called “special law”, and are not applicable
to state Citizens.The Internal Revenue Code is administrative law.Here
are some more quotes from Downes that establish our
point:
“Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98, was an action
of trespass or, as appears by the original record, replevin, brought
in the circuit court for the District of Columbia to try the right
of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that
District. 3 Stat. at L. 216, chap. 60. It was insisted that Congress
could act in a double capacity: in one as legislating [182 U.S.
244, 260] for the states; in the other as a local legislature for
the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted
that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but
for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax
for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District
under art. 1, 8, giving to Congress the power 'to lay and collect
taxes, imposts, and excises,' which 'shall be uniform throughout
the United States,' inasmuch as the District was no part of the
United States. It was held that the grant of this power was
a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended
to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended
to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United
States. The fact that art. 1 , 2, declares that 'representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states .
. . according to their respective numbers' furnished a standard
by which taxes were apportioned, but not to exempt any part of the
country from their operation. 'The words used do not mean that direct
taxes shall be imposed on states only which are represented, or
shall be apportioned to representatives;
but that direct taxation,
in its application to states, shall be apportioned to numbers.'
That art. 1, 9, 4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in
proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia,
'and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal
share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective
states. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the
very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the
census or enumeration referred to.' It was further held that the
words of the 9th section did not 'in terms require that the system
of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories,
as the words of the 2d section require that it shall be extended
to all the states. They therefore may, without violence, be understood
to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed, without imposing
the necessity of taxing them.'”
“There could be no doubt as to the correctness of this conclusion,
so far, at least, as it applied to the District of Columbia.
This District had been a part of the states of Maryland and [182
U.S. 244, 261] Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution,
and was a part of the United States[***].
The Constitution had attached
to it irrevocably.
There are steps which can never be taken backward.
The tie that bound the
states of Maryland and Virginia to the Constitution could not be
dissolved, without at least the consent of the Federal and state
governments to a formal separation. The mere cession of the District
of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority
of the states, but it did not take it out of the United States or
from under the aegis of the Constitution. Neither party had ever
consented to that construction of the cession.
If, before the District
was set off, Congress had passed an unconstitutional act affecting
its inhabitants, it would have been void. If done after
the District was created, it would have been equally void; in other
words, Congress could not do indirectly,
by carving out the District, what it could not do directly. The
District still remained a part of the United States, protected by
the Constitution. Indeed, it would have been a fanciful construction
to hold that territory which had been once a part of the United
States ceased to be such by being ceded directly to the Federal
government.”
[. . .]
“Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the
Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect [182
U.S. 244, 279] that
the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase
or conquest, only when and so far as Congress shall so direct.
Notwithstanding its duty to 'guarantee to every state in this Union
a republican form of government' (art. 4, 4), by which we understand,
according to the definition of Webster, 'a government in which the
supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised
by representatives elected by them,' Congress did not hesitate,
in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida,
the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the
case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much
greater analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state
of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor
and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President.
It was not until they had attained a certain population that power
was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people.
In all these cases, as well as in territories subsequently organized
west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to
extend to Constitution and laws of the United States over them,
or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the
right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.”
Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901)
Based on the
above and further reading of Downes, we can reach
the following conclusions about the applicability of the Constitution
within United States the country:
1. That the District of Columbia and the territories
are not states within the judicial clause of the Constitution giving
jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states;
2. That territories are not states within the meaning
of Rev. Stat. 709, permitting writs of error from this court in
cases where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question;
3. That the District of Columbia and the territories
are states as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers,
with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property;
4. That the territories are not within the clause of
the Constitution providing for the creation of a supreme court and
such inferior courts as Congress may see fit to establish;
5. That
the Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials
therein conducted, and that Congress may lawfully [182
U.S. 244, 271] provide for such trials before consular tribunals,
without the intervention of a grand or petit jury;
6. That
where the Constitution has been once formally extended by Congress
to territories, neither Congress nor the territorial legislature
can enact laws inconsistent therewith, or retract the applicability
of the Constitution to those territories.
7. That Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution
authorizing duties, imposts, and excises (indirect taxes) applies
throughout the sovereign 50 states, and not just on federal land.Here
is the quote from Downes confirming that:
“In delivering the opinion [Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317,
5 L. ed. 98], however, the Chief Justice made certain observations
which have occasioned some embarrassment in other cases. 'The
power,' said he, 'to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises
may be exercised, and must be exercised, throughout the United States.
Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion
of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit but of
one answer. It is the name given to our great Republic which is
composed of states and territories. The District of Columbia, or
the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United
States than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary,
on the principles of our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition
of imposts, duties, and excises should be observed in the one than
in the other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes,
which includes direct taxes, is obviously coextensive with the power
to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, and since the latter
extends throughout the United States, it follows that the power
to impose direct taxes also extends through- [182 U.S. 244, 262]
out the United States.' So far as applicable to the District of
Columbia, these observations are entirely sound. So far as they
apply to the territories, they were not called for by the exigencies
of the case.”
8. Once
a state is accepted into the union of states united under the Constitution,
all lands in the state at that time are then covered by the Constitution
in perpetuity excepting land under federal jurisdiction (enclaves).If
the federal government then chooses to purchase state lands back
after the state joins the union to set up a federal enclave, such
as a military base or federal courthouse or national park, than
the land that facility resides on that formerly was governed by
the Constitution continues in perpetuity to be governed by the Constitution,
even though it then becomes subject to the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction of the federal government under Article 1, Section
8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.
9. States east
of the Mississippi had very little land that continued under federal
jurisdiction at the time they were admitted to the union as states
of the Union.Therefore, nearly the entire state in these cases is
covered by the Constitution.The opposite is true in states west
of the Mississippi, where large portions continued under federal
jurisdiction after these territories were admitted as states.Those
areas that were federal enclaves at the date of admission which
continue to this day to be under federal jurisdiction are not subject
to the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.
10. Direct federal
taxes and rights are mutually exclusive. You will note that when
a new state is admitted to the Union, its lands then irrevocably
have the Constitution attached to them and are covered by the Bill
of Rights while at the same time, a new requirement to apportion
all direct taxes is added in the former territory. The reason is
that once people have rights, they become sovereign
and at that point, it becomes impossible for the federal government
under the Constitutional protections to encroach on those rights
by trying to collect direct taxes because direct taxes then must
be apportioned to each state as required under Article 1, Section
2, Clause 3, and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution.This
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41 (1900):
“Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the
possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are levied
upon the happening of an event as an exchange.”
[Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)]
We now summarize the above findings graphically to make them
crystal clear
and useful in front of a judge and jury
in court:
Table 4‑3: Constitutional
rights throughout the United States* (country)
|
#
|
Type of property
|
Constitutional
Rights
|
Example
|
Authorities
|
|
1
|
Territories
|
No
|
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, etc.
|
1. Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901);
2. M'Culloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 422, 4 L. ed. 579, 605, and in United States
v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 10 L. ed. 573
|
|
2
|
Federal enclaves
within
states:
|
NA
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
2.1
|
Ceded to federal gov.
after
joining union
|
Yes
|
Federal courthouses
|
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
|
|
2.2
|
Also enclaves at the time of
admission
|
No
|
Indian reservations
|
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
|
|
3
|
Sovereign states
|
Yes
|
California, Texas, etc.
|
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
|
|
4
|
District of Columbia
|
Yes
|
District of Columbia
|
1. Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901).
2. Loughborough v. Blake,
18 U.S. 317, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L. ed. 98 (1820)
|
|
5
|
Foreign countries (nations)
|
No
|
Japan
|
1. Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901).
2. Cook v. Tait,
265 U.S. 47 (1924)
3. M'Culloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 422, 4 L. ed. 579, 605 (1819)
4. United States v. Gratiot,
14 Pet. 526, 10 L. ed. 573
5. Springville v. Thomas,
166 U.S. 707 , 41 L. ed. 1172, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717 (1897)
|
IMPORTANT:
Those areas listed above where there are no Constitutional rights
are the only
areas where direct income taxes under Subtitle A can be applied
to individuals without apportionment and without violating (clauses
1:9:4 and 1:2:3 of) the Constitution. Everyplace else,
it isn’t a tax, but a
donation.
The federal zone, or federal “United States**”, is the area of
land over which the Congress exercises an unrestricted, exclusive
legislative jurisdiction.The Congress, however, does
not have unrestricted,
exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any of the 50 sovereign
states. It is bound by the chains of the Constitution.This point
is so very important, it bears repeating throughout the remaining
chapters of this book and it also explains why the use of the word
“State” in the Internal Revenue Code doesn’t by default (26
U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (10)) mean one of the 50 sovereign states
of the union. As in the apportionment rule for direct taxes and
the uniformity rule for indirect taxes, Congress cannot join or
divide any of the 50 sovereign states without the explicit approval
of the Legislatures of the state(s) involved.This means that Congress
cannot unilaterally delegate such a power to the President.Congress
cannot lawfully exercise (nor delegate) a power which it simply
does not have.
For further evidence of what constitutes the “federal zone” and
a “State” within the IRC, we refer you to the fascinating analysis
found in section 5.6.12.2 entitled “The definition of the word ‘state’”,
key to unlocking Congress’ ruse and the limited application of the
Internal Revenue Code”.